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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT OF 1977: A PRIVATE RIGHT
OF ACTION?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19771 (the Act) was passed
as a consequence of revelations of foreign and domestic bribes,
kickbacks, political payoffs and other questionable financial practices by corporations throughout the past several years.2 The Act
requires issuers of securities subject to the registration and reporting provisions of the Securities Exchange Act .of 1934 to comply
with specific accounting standards. 3 In addition, the Act provides
for civil and criminal liability when an issuer4 or any domestic
concern5 not an issuer6 uses the mails or any instrumentality of
interstate commerce in furtherance of certain payments to foreign
officials.
The Act, at the request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, contains controversial standards7 similar to regulations previously proposed by the Commission.8 The accounting provision
requires issuers, but not domestic concerns, to keep books, records,
and accounts which accurately reflect the transactions and dispositions of the issuer's assets. The issuer is also required to devise
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances of the following: (1) that transactions are executed in accordance with management's authoriza1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, 78dd, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. 1 1977) (amending scattered
sections of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976)).
2. Herlihy & Levine, Illicit Corporate Payments, 8 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus.
547-48 (1976).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
4. Id. § 78dd-1 (Supp. I 1977).

5. Id. § 78dd-2 (Supp. 1 1977). This section reads in part: (d) As used in this
section:

(1) The term "domestic concern" means (A) any individual who is a
citizen, national, or resident of the United States; or (B) any corporation,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of
business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a
State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of
the United States.
6. Id.
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976 & Supp. 1977).
8.

41 Fed. Reg. 47,300 (1976).
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tion, (2) that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit
preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles and to maintain accountability for
assets, (3) that access to assets is permitted only in accordance
with management's authorization, and (4) that the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and that appropriate action is taken with respect
to any differences.
The other major provisions of the Act prohibit corporate bribery.
These sections provide that issuers9 and domestic concerns,"' or
officers, directors, employers, agents, or stockholders acting on
behalf of any issuer or domestic concern, are prohibited from bribing a foreign official, a foreign political party, or an intermediary
of either for purposes of influencing the official or political party
in their official capacities, or inducing them to influence a foreign
government in order to gain business advantage.
Responsibility for investigation and civil enforcement pertaining
to issuers is assigned to the SEC;" when involving domestic concerns these responsibilities are assigned to the Department of Justice. 1 The Justice Department also has full responsibility for crim13
inal prosecutions under the Act.
The Act does not expressly provide for a private right of action.
The SEC asserts that an implied private right of action exists. This
Note will set out the opposing viewpoints and examine the general
development and trend of implied private rights of action under
federal law. It will also review the legislative history of the Act and
the rules applicable to the construction of that legislative history.

II. THE SEcuRrrIEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION POSITION: AN
IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
In February of 1978, the SEC issued a notification of enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act containing the following
statement: "The legislative history of the Act . . . contemplates
that private rights of action properly could be implied under the
Act on behalf of persons who suffer injury as a result of prohibited
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (Supp. I 1977).
10. Id. § 78dd-2 (Supp. I 1977).
11. See id. § 78u(d) (1976).
12. Id. § 78dd-2 (Supp. I 1977).
13. See id. § 78u(c) (1976).
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corporate bribery." 4 This notification release prompted comment'5
to which the SEC responded with an opinion outlining the reasoning underlying its position."8 The SEC opinion relies heavily on the
legislative history of S. 3379, introduced in the 94th Congress,'"
from which two provisions creating private rights of action for
persons injured by the payment of bribes were deleted. One provision was viewed as duplicating and possibly confusing existing
remedies available to shareholders; the other was deemed meritorious but ambiguous.
In addition, the opinion cites testimony given at hearings on the
Act during the 95th Congress."8 Chairman of the SEC Harold M.
Williams, who played a large role in developing the Senate version
of the legislation, testified at the hearings in a manner that assumed a private right. 9 The opinion cites Supreme Court cases
giving particular weight to the views of an administrative agency
when the administrators participated in drafting the legislation
and directly made their views known to Congress in committee
hearings.2 0
In reference to the legislative history, the opinion cites a single
statement in the House report in support of a private right of
action. 2' The opinion dismisses as unimportant statements by Conference Committee members made on the floor of the Senate2 and
Housel denying that such a right was intended. 24 The SEC asserts
that the promoters of the bill favored a private right of action, and
14. 43 Fed. Reg. 7752 (1978).
15. Letter from R. Garcia of the Emergency Committee for American Trade
to the S.E.C. (March 2, 1978).
16. [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,701.
17. S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976).
18. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and
H.R. 1602 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
19. Id. at 198, 219, 221.
20. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192 (1969); United States v. American
Trucking Assn's, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940).
21. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977).
22. 123 CONG. REC. S19401 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Tower).
23. Id. at H12825 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Devine).
24. The Commisson reasoned that the probative value of the statements was
diminished by the failure of Senator John G. Tower and Congressman Samuel
L. Devine to persuade the conferees to reflect their views in the Conference Report.
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that the Supreme Court gives greater weight to sponsors' views
than to the views of the minority.25
The opinion points to Supreme Court cases which recognize that
private rights of action may be implied in favor of intended beneficiaries of a statute when necessary to implement the statute's underlying purposes." It is the SEC's position that shareholders and
27
competitors are among the intended beneficiaries of the Act.
In addition, the opinion finds private rights of action a necessary
supplement to enforcement actions in order to carry out the congressional purpose due to the limited resources of the SEC and the
Department of Justice.2"
III. OPPOSING ViEw: No IMPLIED RIGHT OF AcTION
Assistant Counsel Howard Menell, manager of the bill for
Senator Harrison Williams, one of the Act's29 sponsors, stated that
it was the Senate Committee's intent that there be no implied
private right of action under the Act. The reasons given were: (1)
the SEC has ample authority to enforce the Act, therefore a private
right to fulfill the purposes of the Act is unnecessary; (2) it would
be difficult to determine which private plaintiffs should have such
a right; and (3) the Committee was worried about a possible resulting flood of litigation. For example, shareholders might allege economic harm to themselves or the corporation arising from costly
lawsuits, cancellation of contracts, and lowered stock value as a
result of the corporation's foreign bribery. Competitors could complain of loss of business to the bribing company or increased costs
arising from efforts to gain or retain business.
Menell stated that the members who favored a private right of
25. See NLRB v. Fruit &Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964);
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 288, rehearingdenied, 351 U.S. 980
(1956).
26. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9
(1971); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 426 (1964).
27. Investors because they might suffer serious adverse consequences if confidence in the financial integrity of corporations is impaired by bribery: the com-

pany's image could be damaged, costly lawsuits could result, contracts could be
cancelled, and valuable overseas assets could be appropriated. Competitors because foreign corporate bribes affect the domestic climate when bribery is substituted for healthy competition: efficiency and ethical standards suffer. [1978
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,701, at 80,806 nn. 18 & 19.
28. Id. at 80,806.
29. The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs introduced the Senate version of the anti-bribery legislation.
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action agreed that it would have to be expressly provided for in the
Act because the trend of Supreme Court cases has been to narrow
the implied rights of private plaintiffs. The Committee decided not
to provide a private right of action after a discussion of the section
dealing with accounting controls. They found the section difficult
to interpret and stated it would be misused by litigants, leading
to contradictory and confusing court interpretations of the Act.
Future developments concerning the existence of a private right
of action will take place in the courts. The remainder of this Note
will be devoted to an examination of the bases for evaluating what
the outcome might be.

IV. DEVELOPMENT AND TREND OF IMPLIED PRIVATE RIGHTS OF
ACTION UNDER FEDERAL STATUTES
Corporations are creatures of state law.30 Thus, derivative and
individual actions brought by shareholders against corportions
and/or their officers and directors were once brought only under
state law.
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, however, provided numerous express civil remedies to private plaintiffs.3 1 In 1946, a federal district court held that there was
an implied private right of action under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act and Rule 105-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
signalling a shift from private suits brought under state law to wide
use of the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 105-5 by private plaintiffs. 32
Twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court confirmed that such
33
a cause of action existed.
Further expansion of implied private rights of action came in
1964. The Supreme Court, in J . Case Co. v. Borak,31 allowed
private enforcement of § 14(a),3 5 the proxies provision of the 1934
Act, by a shareholder in a derivative action. The purpose of § 14(a)
is to prevent management or others from obtaining authorization
for corporate action by means of deception or inadequate disclo30. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975).
31. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 15, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77n
(1976); at Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9, 16, 18, 20, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 7 8 p,
78r, 78t (1976).
32. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
33. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
34. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1976).
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sure in proxy solicitation."
The plaintiff in Borak sought to undo a merger between Case
and another corporation. She wished to avail herself of federal law
because Wisconsin law required posting of a $75,000 bond in cases
brought under state law.
One important aspect of Borak is that the Court allowed a private suit under federal law in a case where the shareholder's statelaw court alleged a breach of the director's fiduciary duty to the
stockholders-an area of corporate regulation normally subject to
control by the states." The Court reasoned that allowing state law
to control cases involving deceptive proxy statements would nullify
the federal law because the law of the state might attach no responsibility to the use of misleading proxy statements. The whole
purpose of the law could thus be frustrated. The Court noted further that state courts' requirements such as separate suits and
posting of bond as security for expenses might make effective relief
impossible.
The Court found both private direct and derivative actions proper in order to carry out one of the 1934 Act's chief purposesthe protection of investors. The Court further found that private
enforcement of the proxy rules is a necessary supplement to
Commission action.
In 1970, the Supreme Court expanded Borak in Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co.3" by adopting a test allowing plaintiffs to prove causation more easily. This case also involved defective proxies. The
Court further encouraged private suits by awarding attorney's
fees-ordinarily not recoverable as costs-because the fees were
incurred for the benefit of the corporation and the other shareholders.
Other cases, however, especially recent ones, have negatively
affected rights of private litigants under federal statutes. The Supreme Court, in Blue Chip Stamps v. ManorDrug Stores, 9 refused
to expand the plaintiff class to potential purchasers, noting that
their claims would be purely speculative. Blue Chip leaves nonshareholders who suffered harm because they decided not to pur36. 377 U.S. at 431.
37. "Whatever theory one may hold as to the nature of the corporate entity,
it remains a wholly artificial creation whose internal relations between management and stockholders are dependent upon state law ...

Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 549 (1949).

38. 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
39. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).

."

Cohen v. Beneficial
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chase or sell because of an unduly gloomy representation or the
omission of favorble material without a federal law remedy; shareholders, on the other hand, may frequently be able to circumvent
the limitation through bringing a derivative action on behalf of the
corporate issuer if the latter is itself a purchaser or seller of securities.
The Court's decision not to broaden the corporation's civil liability was based on policy grounds, the Court reasoning that
"litigation under Rule 10b-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness
different in degree and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general." 0 Elaborating on that theory, the Court discussed
the potential disruption of business activities by nuisance of
"strike" suits and the threat of extensive discovery. In addition,
the Court was concerned that bystanders using hindsight would
seek to recover substantial damages based only on their own testimony as proof of harm suffered.
Blue Chip was followed in rapid succession by Cort v. Ash" and
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,42 both of which potentially restrict
the rights of private plaintiffs in suits under federal statutes.
In Cort v. Ash, the issue was whether a private cause of action
for damages is to be implied in favor of a corporate shareholder
under § 610 of the Federal Election Campaign Act,43 a statute
making illegal a corporate contribution in connection with a Presidential election. The shareholder also invoked pendent jurisdiction
for a claim under Delaware law, alleging that the expenditures of
corporate funds by a corporate director were ultra vires and a
breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation.
The Court, in holding a private cause of action unavailable
under § 610, set out the following standards for determining
whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one.
1. Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted?
2. Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create or deny such a remedy?
3. Is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?

40.

Id. at 739.

41.
42.
43.

422 U.S. 66 (1975).
425 U.S. 185 (1976).
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 723 (repealed 1976).
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4. Is the cause of action traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?"
The Court, in applying the standards, first looks to the purposes
of the Act and finds that intent to protect corporate shareholders
was at best subsidiary-the primary purpose being the necessity
for destroying the influence over elections which corporations exercised through financial control.
In step two, the Court examined the legislative history of the
Campaign Act and determined that the legislature was not primarily concerned with the internal relations between the corporations
and their shareholders, stating that, "in those situations in which
we have inferred a federal private cause of action not expressly
provided, there has generally been a clearly articulated federal
right in the plaintiff, . . . or a pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the plaintiff class and the defendant
class in a particular regard. . .. " The Court states it is dubious
whether Congress intended to vest in the plaintiff class rights
broader than those provided by state regulation of corporations,
[and] the fact that there is no suggestion at all that § 610 may give
rise to a suit for damages or, indeed, to any civil cause of action,
reinforces the conclusion that the expectation, if any, was that the
relationship between corporations and their stockholders would continue to be entrusted to state law.4"
In step three, the Court distinguished Borak's mandate that
courts be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make
effective the congressional purpose, stating that the remedy sought
in this instance would not aid the primary congressional goal of
preventing corporate influence on a federal election. Borak permits
federal law to intrude into areas normally reserved to state regulation of corporations only where the purpose of the federal law
might be frustrated by contrary state law.
Finally, the Court relegated the plaintiff to whatever remedy is
afforded by state law, noting that in addition to the ultra vires
action, the use of corporate funds in violation of federal law, under
the law of some states, may give rise to a cause of action for breach
of fiduciary duty.

44. 422 U.S. at 78.
45. Id. at 82.
46. Id. at 82-84.
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In Hochfelder, decided soon after Cort v. Ash, the defendant
accounting firm was charged with aiding and abetting a fraud
practiced upon securities purchaser by its negligent failure to conduct an audit thorough enough to have disclosed the fraud. The
Supreme Court held that a private action for damages will not lie
under Section 10(b) in the absence of an allegation of intent to
deceive. The Court indicated that scienter might include reckless
conduct,47 but is unknown whether courts will interpret Hochfelder
as requiring a lesser standard than traditional intent. The Court's
ruling ignored the case law trend toward a standard somewhere
between negligence and intent.48 The decision not only negatively
affected private plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5, but also raised the
spectre that SEC enforcement rights may have been narrowed as
well; it is unclear whether injunctive actions brought by the SEC
will now have to meet the tougher standard.49
The groundwork is now laid for an examination of the legislative
history underlying the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
V.

LEGISLATIvE HISTORY

The Act arose out of the need for legislation to curb corporate
bribery. The problem first became apparent in 1973 when, as a
result of information uncovered by the Watergate Special Prosecutor, the SEC became aware of a pattern of corporate conduct involving illegal corporate payments, both domestic and foreign."
In 1976, the 94th Congress received at least six legislative proposals addressed to the issue of improper foreign payments.' S.
3418, recommended by the SEC, required issuers to maintain strict
accounting standards and prohibited the knowing falsification of
accounting records. It was later incorporated into S. 3664, along
with a criminalization provision prohibiting bribes. Neither S.
3664, nor S. 3418, provided a private right of action. S. 3379, another in the series of legislative proposals, contained disclosure
provisions, provisions relating to corporate governance, and a pri47.
48.

49.
50.

425 U.S. at 193 n.12.
22 VILL. L. REv. 1238 (1977).
Id. at 1249.
Hearings, supra note 18, at 214.

51. Id. at 91. These proposals were: S.3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
S.3418, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S.3664, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S.3379,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S.3741, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 15149, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
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vate triple damages remedy, but lacked the accounting and auditing requirements.
In its discussion of the various bills, the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs noted that S.3379 originally
had included two provisions creating new private rights of action
for persons injured by the payment of bribes. 5 The Committee
deleted the provision in section 9 of S. 3379 creating a new shareholder's right of action, largely because the Committee believed
duplication and confusion concerning existing remedies available
to the shareholders might result.
The Committee found merit in section 10, which proposed a
private cause of action for any person who could establish actual
damage to his business resulting from illegal payments made by a
competitor, but rejected it because it "created ambiguities." The
Committee further stated that its decisions concerning private
causes of action for competitive damage and for violation of securities laws were not intended to affect existing law concerning private causes of action under present federal securities law.
Choosing from among the alternatives, the Committee favorably
reported S. 3664, expressing its purpose as "a national policy
against corporate bribery that transcends the narrower objective of
adequately disclosing material information to the investor." 3
The Committee stated that under S.3664 responsible officials
who had knowledge of bribery and approved the practice could be
prosecuted under the concepts of aiding and abetting, and joint
participation, in the same manner as they previously have been
both in SEC enforcement actions and in private actions brought
under the securities laws. The Senate, by a unanimous vote of 860, passed S. 3664.11 The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on the House counterpart of S.3664,
but the House failed to complete work on the legislation before its
adjournment.
Soon after the 95th Congress convened in 1977, Senators Proxmire and Williams introduced S.305. Title I of the bill was identical to S. 3664. 5
In the Senate report, the Committee discussed the provision
52. See note 17 supra.
53. Id. at 5.
54. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4098, 4099.
55. Id.
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(later deleted) prohibiting knowing falsificaton of accounting records, and concluded that the provision is not intended to make
conduct which is merely negligent unlawful. 8 The Committee
noted, however, that the knowledge required is that the defendant
be aware that he is committing the act which is false-not that he
know that his conduct is illegal.58 The Commission's concern regarding the proper standard of intent is reflected in the House
report as well, and it is possible that both committees' attitudes
toward a private right of action were influenced by this concern,
as will be discussed later.
There is no discussion of a private right of action in the legislative history of S. 305. The Committee did note the importance of
an adequate system of internal accounting controls to shareholders
and potential investors. To find an intent to create an implied
private right of action under Cort v. Ash, however, it is necessary
to show that the primary purpose of the Act is to protect investors.
It is clear from the discussion that follows concerning the need for
the legislation that such is not the case.
Commenting on the need for the legislation, the Committee
pointed to the adverse effect corporate bribery has on foreign relations, the image of American democracy, confidence in the financial integrity of corporations, the efficient functioning of our capital markets, the stability of overseas business, domestic competitive climate, and ultimately, on public confidence in the integrity
of the United States business system. The Committee's concern
focused almost solely on fostering a favorable business climate.
H.R. 3815, the House counterpart of S. 305, was similar to S. 305
in its enforcement provisions but lacked the accounting requirements. The House report57 on H.R. 3815 contains this reference to
a private right of action:
The Committee intends that the courts shall recognize a private
cause of action based on this legislation, as they have in cases involving other provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, on behalf
of persons who suffer injury as a result of prohibited corporate bribery. The recognition of such a private cause [of action] would enhance the deterrent effect of this legislation and provide a necessary supplement to the enforcement efforts of the Commission and
the Department of Justice.58

56. Id. at 9, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4107.
57. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
58. Id. at 10.
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The House committee viewed the legislation as necessary for
generally the same reasons given by the Senate Committee. The
House report made no mention of the need to protect investors.
Whereas the Senate bill included an intent standard, the House
committee stated emphatically that it intended no requirement of
proof of intent in a Commission enforcement action brought under
this bill or under any of the federal securities laws. The committee
was referring to the issue left open by Hochfelder-whetherproof
of scienter would be required in Commisson enforcement of Rule
10b-5. The problem concerning the standard of intent appeared to
be of great concern to both committees. A major consideration may
have been that while a negligence standard would aid SEC enforcement, it might also expose companies to an intolerable
amount of private litigation. Conversely, an intent standard might
inhibit SEC enforcement.
The minority members had reservations about the bill. They
objected to, among other things, the split enforcement responsibility, preferring total Justice Department control. They reasoned
that the investigation of illegal payoffs to foreign officials is only
indirectly related to the SEC's primary responsibility-the protection of investors.
During House hearings concerning H.R. 3815,11 testimony was
received from Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal, Chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission Williams, public interest
groups, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the bar.
A committee of the New York City Bar Association submitted a
0
lengthy statement questioning the need for the legislation." The
bar opposed the accounting requirements and criminal penalties,
favoring, at most, a disclosure system. The bar committee viewed
the disclosure approach as sufficient because both disclosure and
failure to disclose foreign bribes could give rise to litigation, including shareholder suits.
The bar committee expressed grave reservations about the inclusion of accounting requirements, stating that "the guldelir-like
broadness of the statutory language makes it difficult to predict
what civil or criminal penalties would be imposed in any given
situation."" In addition, the bar committee noted that the accounting requirements intimate that the SEC is seeking to im69. Hearings, supra note 18.
60. Id. at 53.
61. Id. at 96.
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prove internal corporate operational performance, which raises serious questions about the propriety of federal regulation in an area
traditionally reserved for the states. Furthermore, it "creates the
possibility that the SEC would be diverted from its traditional
6' 2
objectives.
In its testimony, the SEC took the position that the direct prohibition against certain payments to foreign officials contained in
H.R. 3815 was "designed to proscribe . ... conduct which is not
supported in our society and [which] tends to erode not only
ethical standards but the free, competitive and effective marketplace. . ...
-" The SEC viewed power to enforce the prohibitions
as an expansion of its mandate-at one time having expressed
concern over whether it should be responsible for enforcement,
even concerning its own registrants, since the prohibitions seem to
arise from congressional objectives not strictly related to investor
protection.
The SEC was willing to accept that mandate, but strongly urged
the inclusion of corporate accounting controls similar to those in
S. 305. According to the SEC, these controls would furnish the
Commission and private plaintiffs in implicit actions with "potent
new tools" to use against those who conceal the manner in which
corporate funds have been utilized.
In reference to the accounting controls, the Commission opposed
the requirement of showing that any deception of auditors or falsification of accounting records was knowingly committed. The
Commisson noted that S. 305 contained an intent standard, but
expressed the understanding that the Senate Banking Committee's report would clearly state that the knowledge required was
merely that the defendant was aware he was committing the
act-not that he knew the act was unlawful.
The SEC alone wanted a less stringent standard of proof of state
of mind. The Federal Regulation of Securities Commiteee of the
American Bar Association" opposed the accounting provisions,
fearing that the guidelines specified in the bill would be unfair
when applied as a standard for federal civil and criminal penalties.
The Bar Committee criticized the provision as not requiring an
intent to do an improper act and as giving rise to a "dangerously

62.
63.
64.

Id. at 128.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 249.
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broad area of potential liability with undefined boundaries
The bill reported out by the Conference Committee" contained
two major sections under Title I: the Senate-sponsored provisions
requiring issuers subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC to maintain
accurate books, records and accounts, and internal accounting
controls; and the provisions contained in both the Senate and
House bills prohibiting certain payments to foreign officials. The
accounting section was amended to delete the provision prohibiting knowing falsification of accounting records and knowing misstatements to accountants. "Although these provisions were supportive of the basic accounting section, the use of the 'knowingly'
standard has become involved in an issue never intended to be
raised or resolved by the Senate bill-namely, whether or not the
inclusion or deletion of the word 'knowingly' would or would not
affirm, expand, or overrule the decision of the Supreme Court in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (425 U.S. 185)."11 Thus, the Conference Committee excised even the requirement of proof of intent to
do the act.
Responsibility for enforcement of the Act was divided between
the SEC and the Justice Department, with the Justice Department having full control over domestic concerns, and control over
criminal prosecutions of issuers.
When the Conference Report was presented, Senator Tower
stated: "The House report states it is expected that the courts will
recognize implied private rights of action under the criminalization sections of the bill. This question was not considered in the
Senate .

...08

In the House, Representative Staggers explained that the final
bill contained a provision not in the House bill, which required
companies filing with the SEC to keep accurate records and maintain accounting controls. Representative Devine informed the
body that "the conferees did not intend to create a private right
of action."69 Representative Staggers, a sponsor of H.R. 3815, spoke
directly after Representative Devine and made no response to that
65.
66.
CONG.

67.
68.
69.

Id. at 258.
H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1977l U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS 4121.
Id. at 10.
See note 22 supra.
See note 23 supra.
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statement. Both the Senate and the House agreed to the Conference Report.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is necessary to begin with Cort v. Ash in an attempt to determine whether Congress intended an implied private right of action
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The first consideration
is whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose "especial
benefit" the statute was enacted. (Emphasis in original.) It must
be noted whether the Act was passed for the "especial benefit" of
shareholders and competitors of the offending corporations. The
Senate Report" mentioned, in passing, the value to shareholders
of an adequate system of internal accounting controls. The section
of the report devoted to the need for the legislation, however, does
not refer to investors at all-even though it does point out the
adverse effect of corporate bribery on the domestic competitive
climate. Even that comment appears to fit within a framework of
general concern that foreign corporate bribery blemishes the country's image and damages the United States business system.
It seems certain that exposure of illegal corporate payments
would be harmful to a corporation and could conceivably result in
financial loss to the corporation and its shareholders. Competitors
also might suffer economic damage from losing business to the
bribing corporation. Clearly, however, the Act was the expression
of a broad national policy against corporate bribery, not just the
narrow purpose of benefitting shareholders, competitors, and
others. In passing the Act, Congress was not primarily concerned
with the internal relationships between corporations and their
shareholders.
A second factor to be examined is whether there is any indication
of explicit or implicit legislative intent to create an implicit private
right of action. The House Report 7' contains an explicit statement
of intent that the courts should recognize a private right of action
by those injured as a result of prohibited corporate bribery. This
statement was made, however, before the controversial, Senatesponsored accounting provisions were added by the Conference
Committee. It seems significant, also, that Representative Staggers, a sponsor of the bill, did not contradict Representative De70.
71.

See note 54 supra.
See note 57 supra.
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vine's disclaimer of an intent to create a private right of action
when Staggers addressed the House directly after Devine's statement. Noting these statements and the surrounding circumstances, one could infer that the Committee backed away from any
desire they might once have had that there be an implied private
right of action-possibly because of the addition of the accounting
provisions.
The Senate Committee made no reference to a private right
during the course of its deliberations in the 95th Congress. Senator
Tower, however, made an uncontradicted disclaimer on the Senate
floor similar to Representative Devine's statement in the House.
The SEC 2 believes the statements of Senator Tower and Representative Devine have little probative value because the two men
were not sponsors of the bill and did not attempt to persuade the
conferees to reflect their views in the Conference Report.
Senator Tower and Representative Devine, however, may have
thought it unnecessary to ask the Committee explicitly to reject a
private right of action. Failure to discuss a private right should not
be read as reflecting the Committee's intent that there be such
a right.
In further support of its position that there is a private right, the
SEC points to statements made by the Senate Committee during
the 94th Congress. 3 The Committee deleted an express private
right of action from S. 3379 calling it duplicative of existing remedies. Regardless of how that statement is interpreted, S. 3379 was
largely a disclosure bill containing no accounting provisions; it
bore little resemblance either to S. 3664, passed by the Senate
during the 94th Congress, or to the Act in its final form. The
legislative history of S. 3664, not being contemporaneous with the
bill finally enacted, would seem to have no bearing on the determination of whether an implied private right was intended under the
Act. It is logical to assume that new circumstances and understandings might arise in the course of development of a bill from
one Congress to another.
In reference to testimony presented at Committee hearings during the 95th Congress, the SEC indicates that the New York City
74
Bar Association "advocated" an implied private right of action.
That is not precisely correct. The Bar Committee discussed, in
72.
73.
74.

See note 16 supra.
See note 17 supra.
See note 16 supra.
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general, shareholder suits within the traditional framework, concluding that private suits should serve to redress injuries to the
corporation resulting from improper foreign payments as they have
for other wrongful conduct of officers and directors.75
The Bar Committee, however, opposed legislation making improper foreign payments illegal or imposing accounting controls,
proposing instead that any anti-bribery legislation passed be limited to disclosure requirements. In discussing the accounting provisions in the Senate bill, the Bar Committee noted that they require
each issuer to establish a system of internal accounting controls
and that they seek to assure the truth and accuracy of statements
made to auditors. The Committee was concerned that these provisions go beyond what is required to meet the problems addressed
by the Act, and represent a significant increase in federal regulatory jurisdiction over the internal affairs of corporations. Thus, the
Committee raises broad and important issues with respect to the
appropriate extent of federal corporate regulation and concerning
the appropriate relations between state and federal jurisdiction.
One of the Bar Committee's concerns was the low level of proof of
intent required for liability under the accounting provision. In view
of the Bar Committee's opposition to Commission activity even in
the area of accounting, it is highly unlikely they would advocate
an implied right of action for private plaintiffs in an Act containing
such a provision; and in fact they did not. Even if the Bar Committee had made statements advocating an implied private right
under the Act, however, such remarks would be entitled to little
weight."
Chairman of the SEC, Harold M. Williams, testifying at the
hearings, did advocate a private right of action and has continued
to do so. For agency interpretation to be given deference, however,
it must be consistent with the Congressional purpose.77 It could be
argued that Congress, in passing this legislation, was not significantly concerned with protecting individual shareholders. Commissioner Williams has testified to that effect."
There are, therefore, three pieces of relevant evidence regarding
explicit intent: a single statement supporting an implied private
right in the House Committee report which was made before the

75.

Hearings, supra note 18.

76.
77.

425 U.S. at 1386 n.24.
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974).

78.

Hearings, supra note 18, at 210.
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controversial accounting requirements became part of the House
bill; uncontradicted floor statements by non-sponsors of the bill
denying that a private right exists; and statements made at hearings.
There is little in the legislative history that infers an implicit
intent for a private right. There are indications, however, that the
Senate and House Committees had intended that there be no private right. The Hochfelder decision construing Section 10(b),
handed down March 30, 1976, can be read as requiring the SEC
to prove intent in its enforcement actions under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.19 This decision was mentioned with concern several
times in the various Committee discussions. The House Committee, particularly, was determined that no proof of scienter should
be required of the Commission for any of its enforcement activities." The Senate-sponsored record falsification prohibition was
deleted, therefore, because it required proof of intent.
At the same time, opponents of the bill expressed grave concern
that the required proof pertinent to state of mind was so low that
it would create dangerously broad liability."1 The Committee
clearly wanted the Commission to be able to enforce the Act without having to meet a high standard of proof of intent. It is logical
to assume, however, that the Committees were sensitive to the
concerns expressed by opponents of the bill and were wary of exposing corporations and their officers and directors to a potential
avalanche of litigation brought by private plaintiffs encouraged to
sue by the low burden of proof concerning intent..
The provision for divided enforcement responsibility strengthens
the inference that the Committees intended no private right of
action. Issuers alone are subject to both the accounting requirements and the anti-bribery provision and only they can sue under
the federal securities laws. Domestic concerns are subject only to
the bribery prohibition. Private plaintiffs with complaints against
domestic concerns would have a cause of action, if any, only for
corporate bribery, and the suits would have to be brought under
state law. It seems unlikely that Congress intended that shareholders of issuers should have broader remedies under the Act than
shareholders of domestic concerns. Perhaps, therefore, it can be
inferred from the complexity of the Act itself that no private right

79. See note 48 supra.
80. See note 57 supra.
81. Hearings, supra note 18, at 95, 252, 255-56, 258.
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of action was intended.
The third consideration under Cort v. Ash is whether an implied
private right of action is consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislative scheme. The underlying -purpose of the Act appears to be much broader than merely the protection of shareholders or other individuals. Both the Senate and House stressed the
importance of eliminating corporate bribery in order to preserve
the health of the overall business climate."s It could be argued that
recovery of monetary damages by a private plaintiff or the corporation in a derivative suit would add little or nothing to what Commisson enforcement can accomplish toward achieving the goal of
eliminating corporate bribery for the sake of business in general.
In step four, the question to be addressed is whether the cause
of action is one traditionally relegated to state law in an area which
is basically of state concern. If so, it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law. The Supreme Court,
in enunciating this standard, firmly points private plaintiffs back
toward state courts, perhaps signalling Congress that if it intends
a private right of action under a federal statute it will have to
provide expressly for that right in the legislation itself.
It is significant that the SEC views its role as enforcer of the
prohibition against corporate bribery as an expansion of its mandate to protect shareholders. Prior to passage of the Act, shareholders would almost certainly have had to seek relief in state
court for harm to themselves or the corporation arising out of corporate bribery, using such theories as ultra vires acts or breach of
fiduciary duty.
The New York City Bar Association takes the position that the
accounting provisions seem to involve the SEC in seeking to improve internal corporate operational performance-an area of regulation traditionally reserved for the states. The issue is very similar
to that in Cort v. Ash: whether the primary purpose of the federal
law would be thwarted by allowing state law to govern. Unlike the
federal proxy regulation statute in Borak, the anti-bribery statute
considered here was not passed primarily to protect investors.
Therefore, refusal of a state court to grant relief to an individual
plaintiff would not nullify the federal law.
In fact, a federal district court recently ruled 4 that it is not
82. See notes 54 & 57 supra.
83.

Hearings, supra note 18, at 225.

84. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., [1978-1979 Transfer Binder]
REP. (CCH) 96,721 (D.C. Minn. Dec. 7, 1978).
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against the public policy underlying the Securities Exchange Act
to allow directors to bar a shareholder's derivative action against
other directors to recover civil and criminal penalties levied
against the corporation for making illegal foreign payments. The
court noted that the claim primarily appeared to involve questions
of corporate waste and mismanagement-issues properly dealt
with under state laws. The result in this case indicates that, under
Borak and Cort v. Ash, private direct actions under federal law
against those engaged in illegal foreign payments are not necessary
in order to carry out the Act's chief purposes.
If one concludes, under Cort v. Ash, that there is no implied
private right of action, it becomes unnecessary to construe the Act
to determine what that implied right is. It would be a difficult task
because of the split enforcement responsibility and determination
of the scope of liability based on whether the defendant is an issuer
or a domestic concern.
Were private plaintiffs to survive the Cort v. Ash analysis, however, they would have to confront the recent trend of the Supreme
Court toward narrowing individual plaintiff's rights against corporations under federal laws, of which Cort itself is an example.
The Supreme Court's retrenchment on private rights of action
has a basis in reason. The early cases, with their broadly worded
opinions construing the federal securities laws in the context of
private litigation, were beneficial to the SEC but carried within
them the potential for frivolous litigation against deep-pocketed
defendants, which raised troublesome policy questions. "There has
85
been no dearth of such litigation.
The Supreme Court has begun to narrow the rights of private
plaintiffs. First, it refused to broaden the plaintiff class under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,18 partially because of the extent of
monetary damages that might flow from enlarging the class to
include potential purchasers. Second, it narrowed Borak by directing private plaintiffs to state courts when the purpose of the federal
law under which they seek refuge will not be frustrated.87 Third,
the Court rules, for fear of broadening the plaintiff class, that
defendants who were merely negligent are not liable to private
plaintiffs under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.11
85. Pitt, An Insider's View of the Utility of Private Litigation Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 5 SEc. REG. L.J. 3, 4 (1977).
86. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
87. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
88. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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Harvey L. Pitt, General Counsel of the SEC at the time of the
hearings, finds these decisions not totally unjustified. 9 Pitt believes the Supreme Court desires to stem the increasing flow of
private civil litigation clogging the dockets of federal courts by
relegating private plaintiffs either to state law remedies in state
courts or to no remedy at all.
Pitt also sees a genuine concern on the part of the Court for more
certainty and less exposure to risk for good-faith corporate endeavors. He finds the recent Supreme Court decisions a far cry from the
Borak case where private litigation was held to be a necessary
supplement to the Commission's enforcement actions. "It no
longer is a 'necessary' supplement and one fears that it may not
even seem desirable to the Court in the long run."' "
Also, Pitt, who accompanied Commissioner Williams to the
House Subcommittee hearings on the Act, seems not overly concerned that there may be fewer private litigants breaking new
frontiers. He notes that recent foreign payment cases suggest the
SEC is successfully carrying out that task. The SEC might in fact
be better off with fewer private litigants developing the law because they bring less carefully considered lawsuits with their associated risks.
The Commisson states that there is a private right of action. The
Supreme Court, however, must ultimately decide the issue, and it
is likely that the Court will find that Congress intended no cause
of action for private litigants under the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.
Mary Frances Lyle
89.
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Pitt, supra note 85.
Pitt, supra note 85, at 11.

